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Carpe Crisis: Considering the Creation of Social Businesses

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.1

I’m saddened and offended by the idea that companies exist to enrich their owners . . . . That
is the very least of their roles; they are far more worthy, more honorable, and more important
than that. Without the vital creative force of business, our world would be impoverished
beyond reckoning.2

The severity of the financial situation facing the world community cannot be
overstated. Hundreds of thousands of people are losing their jobs, their homes, and a
standard of living that they had learned to take for granted. The economic straits
that many average individuals find themselves in are fueling an immense anger at
the excesses of the capitalist system. The vitriol unleashed upon AIG for paying
bonuses to the very executives who led that corporation to the brink of insolvency
aptly demonstrates the public’s frustration with the greed and inequity that many
believe runs rampant in the current model of corporate behavior. Tempers run hot
against those who are perceived to be both the cause and the beneficiaries of the
general public’s pain. Witness the experience of Fred Goodwin, the former chief
executive officer of the Royal Bank of Scotland, whose home and car were vandalized.
Or Luc Rousselet, the manager of a 3M factory in France, who was held hostage for
two days by workers who were angry at proposed severance packages. 3
Responses to the crisis facing the world economy are many and varied. There is
great casting of blame and looking for scapegoats,4 as well as many suggestions for
new regulatory approaches toward financial markets and corporate governance,
including the historic overhaul of finance rules recently proposed by the Obama
administration.5 The changes proposed, among other things, would create a new
regulatory authority for consumer products, move private trading of complex
insurance instruments onto public exchanges, and prohibit many firms from selling
1.

Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1976) (1759).

2.

Dennis Hevesi, Michael Hammer, Business Writer, Dies at 60, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2008, at B6.

3.

Julia Werdigier & Matthew Saltmarsh, Hurt By Economy, Europeans Vent Their Anger, N.Y. Times, Mar.
26, 2009, at B1.

4.

See, e.g., Gerald W. McEntee, An Expectation of Accountability, Wash. Post, June 15, 2009, at A14 (“As
shareholders . . . we have every right to insist that the corporate board be held accountable for its disastrous
mismanagement, greed and arrogance.”); Editorial, Payback for Payoffs, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 19, 2009, at
18A (“[I]n its fury, the nation must not forget the recession’s larger tragedy of lost life savings, jobs, homes
and dreams caused by recent widespread regulatory failure and greed, personal and corporate.”).

5.

See Damian Paletta, Historic Overhaul of Finance Rules, Wall St. J., June 18, 2009, at A1. For a
discussion of other risks to our economic stability, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51
Ariz. L. Rev. 127 (2009) (arguing that rogue trading might be the greatest threat to bank stability and
soundness); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2009) (discussing the theories and evidence regarding the causes of the turmoil in the
subprime market).
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mortgages without keeping some “skin in the game.” Although the main focus of
discussion about the economic crisis is directed at its causes and cures, there is
another important dialogue taking place. That conversation starts with the idea that
what causes despair for many might provide a window of opportunity for others. The
prevailing negative public impression of corporations and corporate executives,
combined with the perception that the accepted model of capitalism has broken
down, provides a chance to rethink the dominant view of corporate behavior and
purpose, and may facilitate a re-conceptualization of the basic structure of businesses
and ways of harnessing the power of capitalism.
Why is this an opportune moment to challenge the prevalent view of the role of
corporations in society? First, the current crisis highlights disparities in wealth and
circumstance, strengthening the hand of those who argue that the capitalist system
is fundamentally flawed and in need of reform. When even luminaries such Alan
Greenspan admit overestimating the power of the free market,6 the time is ripe for
rethinking the operations of that market. Second, the hardship the collapse of the
world economy has caused for so many engenders feelings of compassion and
commonality among those whose lives have been thrown into turmoil. Together,
these facts indicate that the crisis provides an opportunity to consider how corporations
might have a broader focus—one that includes a greater concern with overall societal
welfare than corporate entities have traditionally expressed. That broader focus
accepts the position that corporations are uniquely positioned in and essential to the
world economy and in no way seeks their demise. Rather, it asks if the unequaled
power of corporations can be harnessed such that the positive attributes of capitalism
work for the common good, rather than for the good of a select few shareholders.
This article will describe some of the many approaches currently being considered
for expanding the role that corporations might take in advancing social welfare. As
discussed in greater detail below, current approaches generally take two forms. The
first advocates that all corporations must act in a socially responsible manner, taking
into account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders. Corporate social
responsibility advocates a limited, “do no harm” approach toward corporations’ role
in promoting social welfare. A “socially responsible corporation” may take into
consideration the interests of other stakeholders in the enterprise, including but not
limited to employees, customers, and suppliers. Ultimately, however, the corporation
remains driven by generating a return for its investors, albeit not as large a return as
might be generated if its sole consideration were shareholder wealth maximization.
A second, broader conceptualization of how corporations might advance social
welfare considers how individual business entities could work to advance specific
social goals and attempt to craft businesses that bridge the for-profit/non-profit
divide. Rather than merely considering the interests of a larger group of stakeholders
while remaining primarily profit driven, an entity involved in what I call the “active
advancement” of social good identifies a social problem and specifically designs a
6.

See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,
2008, at B1.
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business to address that problem. Active advancement of social good is a far more
wide-ranging model of using corporate power to directly address specific social
problems than is simply operating a socially responsible business.
This article will consider the practical and legal impediments that each of these
approaches face, and will show that while each approach challenges the notion that
corporations must always act solely to maximize its shareholders’ profits, neither
approach presents a truly new model or a satisfactory alternative. The current crisis
presents an opportunity to challenge our conceptualization of the corporate model
and to consider expanding our understanding of the structure and function of
corporations to enable the vast power of business entities to do more than enrich a
limited population. Perhaps we can design a new form of corporate entity that would
eliminate the current difficulties entrepreneurs encounter when trying to harness
corporate power for social good.
I.	HARNESSING CORPORATE POWER FOR SOCIETAL GOOD: HOW ENTITY FORM
AFFECTS THE ABILITY TO PROMOTE SOCIAL WELFARE

The discussion in this article is based on several starting premises. First, it accepts
that corporations have the ability and are uniquely situated to advance social welfare.
It will not engage in a normative discussion about whether corporate power should
be exercised for “good.” Instead, it accepts that the active advancement of social
welfare is, at times, an appropriate and laudable corporate activity.
Further, it does not define with specificity what constitutes “social good” or
“social welfare.”7 Instead, it assumes that at a minimum “social good” involves more
than shareholder wealth maximization and the “do no harm” approach of corporate
social responsibility advocates. “Social good” means using corporate power to address
specific social problems.
Additionally, although this article describes several methods by which the power
of corporations might be utilized to advance social welfare, it does not advocate that
all corporations, in all situations, must do so. Instead, it suggests that businesses
should be able to choose to operate for such a purpose, but that current laws impair
the ability of existing business entity forms to achieve that end. Because current
entity forms are incapable of allowing entrepreneurs to capture the power of capitalism
and utilize it to advance social good, recognition and creation of new entity forms is
needed.

7.

As is acknowledged, one single definition of such a term is probably impossible to state in this area. See
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1385, 1449 (2008)
(“Corporate law’s ambivalence regarding power constituencies, regarding beneficiaries, and regarding
the achievement of the social good, each reflect larger misgivings about the consistency of shareholders’
interests and incentives with those of society at large.”).
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A. Current Entity Forms
		

1. For-Profit Models

a. Traditional Corporate Form. A key point of this article is that because of their
potential for efficiency and economies of scale, corporations are uniquely positioned
to promote social welfare. The question then becomes, what prevents most
corporations from taking on that role in any meaningful way? Can the traditional
model of the corporation be used as a vehicle for promoting social good? The longdominant model of the firm posits that corporate managers must always act to
maximize profit for their shareholders and that consideration of other interests
violates that obligation. This view was clearly stated in the seminal case Dodge v.
Ford, which held:
There should be no confusion . . . . A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend . . . to
other purposes.8

This “canonical account”9 holds that corporate fiduciary duties require directors
to further their shareholders’ interests and “thus require[s] them to maximize
corporate profits subject to the obligation to comply with independent legal
constraints.”10 The profit-maximizing, shareholder-primacy model of corporate law
leaves little room to consider how corporations might act to promote the social good.
The model “ignores issues about any effects the corporation may have on the external
world,”11 and focuses exclusively on promoting shareholder value. Indeed, the
shareholder-primacy model legally bars corporate managers from acting for the social
good if such action does not redound to shareholder benefit.12
Although the profit-maximizing model of corporate firm behavior may remain
the canonical account, its central premise has long been disputed by proponents of
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).13 CSR generally refers to the right or
responsibility of corporate managers to take into account the interests of a broad
8.

204 Mich. 459, 507 (Mich. 1919).

9.

Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev 733, 736–38 (2005).
Elhauge argues that the “canonical account” overstates the holding of Dodge, which in fact supported
expenditures by directors “‘incidental’ to business operations . . . for the benefit of charities or employees,
rather than for the ultimate benefit of shareholders.” Id. at 773.

10.

Id. at 736 (collecting citations to scholars advocating this view of the obligation of corporate managers
to profit-maximize).

11.

Id. at 737.

12.

See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
131 (1991). Berle and Means maintained that the corporation did not have a duty to serve society and if
directors attempted to do so, they would be acting in violation of their shareholders’ private property
rights. Id.

13.

Corporate social responsibility is just one of the many labels that can be used to describe the position
that profit-maximization is not and should not be the sole focus of corporate directors. Advocates of this
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range of stakeholders in addition to their corporation’s shareholders when engaging
in corporate activity. CSR advocates suggest that directors should cause their
corporations to take purposeful action to minimize the harmful effects and increase
the positive impacts their firm has on the environment, the communities they interact
with, and their employees.14 If CSR were accepted, corporate directors might be able
to consider within their decision-making rubric not only profit-maximization for
shareholders, but broader societal goals.
There is certainly potential for expanding the corporate model to include the
promotion of social good among proper corporate purposes. However, most advocates of
CSR take a somewhat more limited approach. Rather than arguing that corporate
directors should seek to promote social welfare generally, CSR proponents hope simply to
expand the universe of interests directors may consider when taking corporate action.15
Even this more limited approach toward encouraging corporations to engage in
socially responsible behavior has not been fully accepted. While there has been some
movement toward broadening the interests that corporate directors may take into
account, as the history of the CSR movement shows, the profit-maximizing model of
the corporate form remains firmly in place.
The debate over corporate responsibility traces at least from a debate that took
place in the 1930s between Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd. Berle adopted the
standard shareholder-primacy, profit-maximizing position,16 while Dodd adopted a
broader model of the corporate form that acknowledged a role for CSR.17 The
argument over the proper level of social responsibility that corporations should
view also refer to it as “progressive corporate law.” See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate
Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 (2002).
14.

There are voluminous writings by scholars engaging in the debate over the appropriate role for CSR.
See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in The Iconic Cases in Corporate
Law 1 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize
Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 1 (1998); David L. Engel, An
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Edwin M. Epstein, Societal,
Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility—Product and Process, 30 Hastings
L.J. 1287 (1979); see generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Social Responsibility in a
Changing Society: Essays on Corporate Social Responsibility (1972).

15.

See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 9, at 734; Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1; Engel, supra note 14, at 3; Epstein,
supra note 14, at 1288; Blumberg, supra note 14.

16.

In his article, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Berle argued that directors acted as quasi trustees and
were charged with acting for “the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.” A.A.
Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1049 (1931). It should be noted
that Berle later changed his position on this issue and in 1954 published The 20th Century Capitalist
Revolution, in which he accepted Dodd’s position that corporate powers were powers in trust not just
for shareholders but for the whole community. See Adolf A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist
Revolution 5 (1954).

17.

Dodd believed that directors acted as agents for their corporation and as such could “employ its funds in
a manner appropriate to a person . . . with a sense of social responsibility without thereby being guilty of
a breach of trust.” E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1161 (1932).
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exercise continues to the present day.18 Without rehashing the entirety of that long
debate, some developments are worth noting.
After the Berle-Means debate firmly established the shareholder-primacy model,
the issue of CSR entered a long period of relative dormancy. The debate was re-energized
in the 1970s as shareholder activists began to utilize the shareholder proposal
mechanism of SEC Rule 14a-8.19 Shareholder proposals were seen as a method to
advance CSR by forcing corporations to pay heed to, among other things, the
environmental consequences of their actions20 and the greater social implications of
corporate policy.21 This was exemplified by the efforts of Campaign GM, in which a
broad coalition of interested parties attempted to change the dominant conceptualization
of the corporation away from a pure shareholder-primacy model and toward one in
which corporate directors had duties toward broader constituencies.22 Efforts to use
shareholder proposals to advance social good had limited practical impact.23 Nonetheless,
those efforts were important because they added to the CSR discourse and began to
chip away at the shareholder-primacy, profit-maximization model.
CSR again languished, brought low by the failure of the shareholder-proposal
movement and by Milton Friedman’s ringing critique of CSR, which in essence
stated that the only proper action for a corporation was to increase profit for its
shareholders24 —a position that left little room for corporate social responsibility.
CSR was revived in response to the increase in merger and acquisition activity that
took place in the 1980s.25 In response to that surge of takeover activity, many states
adopted laws known as “constituency statutes.”26
18.

A thoughtful treatment of the history of the corporate social responsibility debate can be found in C.A.
Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the TwentyFirst Century, 51 Kan. L. Rev. 77 (2002).

19.

Rule 14a-8 governs the inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy materials and permits a
company to exclude proposals for a variety of reasons, including among others, that the proposal “is not
a proper subject for action by shareholders.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).

20. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112

Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1246–53 (1999).

21.

See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971) (arguing against
Honeywell’s military policy); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. S.E.C., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(urging Dow Chemical to halt napalm production).

22.

For a detailed description of Campaign GM, see Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest:
Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1971).

23.

See Wells, supra note 18, at 117 (“[M]ost shareholders did not want their firms governed in the interests
of the wider community. The few public-interest proposals that reached [GM’s] shareholders’ hands
were overwhelmingly defeated.”).

24.

Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970
(Magazine), at 32.

25.

See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 Yale J. on Reg. 119,
129–31 (1992).

26. Corporate constituency statutes generated a great deal of scholarly writing. See, e.g., Mark E. Van Der

Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 27 (1996); Eric W. Orts,
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14 (1992).
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Corporate constituency statutes codify the right (or obligation) of directors to
consider interests of constituents other than shareholders when making business
decisions. Depending on how the statute is drafted, those constituents may include
employees, consumers, suppliers, and the local community.27 Constituency statutes
were originally conceived to protect the directors of target corporations—allowing
directors to take into consideration interests beyond profit-maximization, and thus
enabling them to reject disfavored offers. 28 CSR advocates quickly seized on the
statutes, noting that such statutes “offered a more capacious view of directors’
fiduciary duties . . . . Almost inadvertently, the legal mechanism for corporate social
responsibility seemed . . . to have been put in place.”29
As with the efforts to use shareholder proposals to advance CSR, corporate
constituency statutes have not fulfilled the promise they initially seemed to offer.
While they remain the law in at least thirty-one states, Delaware has not enacted
such a provision. And while some cases refer to the statutes as a reason for directors
to consider long-term, non-shareholder interests when making business decisions,30
there is surprisingly little analysis of the legality and applicability of constituency
statutes.31 Interest in corporate constituency statutes as a vehicle for advancing CSR
has largely faded.
Despite the lack of success it has achieved, the CSR debate has not been silenced
and many scholars still actively promote a conceptualization of the corporation that
expands directorial duty beyond profit-maximization. However, other scholars just
as vocally argue that while corporate managers necessarily have significant discretion,
including attending to non-shareholders’ interests, the increase in this discretion
desired by CSR proponents would require overhauling corporate governance to give

27.

See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1701.59(E)(1) (2010); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.347 (2009).

28. See Comm. on Corp. Laws, A.B.A. Bus. Law Sec., Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion,

45 Bus. Law. 2253, 2253 (1990).

29. Wells, supra note 18, at 128.
30. See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that Pennsylvania

law requires a director to oppose a tender offer that is harmful to the corporation’s long-term interests,
even at the expense of short-term shareholder interests); Thompson v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc., 639
N.E.2d 462, 469 (Ohio 1994) (stating that directors “must” consider interests of shareholders and “may”
consider interests of creditors); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31, 33
(D. Me. 1989) (“Maine law suggests that the Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests
of the shareholders and corporation, should also consider the interests of the company’s employees, its
customers and suppliers, and communities in which offices of the corporation are located.”); Murray v.
Conseco, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 454, 458–59 (Ind. 2003) (citing constituency statute to state the rule that the
director’s decision was valid because it was made in the interest of the corporation as a whole to remove
a director that the shareholders had voted onto the board); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat’l Fin. Corp.,
675 F. Supp. 238, 241, 265 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (“[T]he Board could consider so-called social issues in
evaluating merger proposals.”).

31.

See Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the
Takings Clause, 24 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1, 8–9 (1998).
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non-shareholders a direct role in governance. 32 These scholars further note that
“managers released from a duty to account to shareholders would be freer to serve
both their own interests and those of society. It is not clear that managers freed from
the shareholders would serve society rather than themselves.”33
The continued resistance toward CSR suggests that the shareholder-primacy
model will continue to predominate. Moreover, to the extent that CSR proponents
make inroads into the shareholder-primacy, profit-maximization model, their
progress will always be constrained. Considering the interests of a broader
constituency of those impacted by corporate action may increase the ability of
corporate managers to cause their entities to act for social “good,” but that good will
still be measured by good redounding to the corporation, albeit in a broader fashion
and perhaps on a longer time frame. This is what I think of as limited, “do no harm”
social responsibility—corporate directors may cause their corporations to take actions
that benefit stakeholders other than shareholders, but only in limited ways.
This type of “do no harm” CSR is quite different from an “active-advancement”
model of social responsibility. An active-advancement model would allow and
encourage corporate managers to further interests that might not have any direct
connection to the welfare of their shareholders and to do so simply for the sake of
promoting social welfare. The constraints of the shareholder-primacy model make it
unlikely that traditional corporate structure will succeed in furthering an activeadvancement model of social engagement for corporate activity.
b. Limited Liability Corporations. The traditional corporate model has been subject
to variation over time, and the limited liability corporation (“LLC”) model has a
number of advantages over the traditional corporate model that make it an attractive
alternative to consider as a vehicle for using the power of business to further social
goals. In most jurisdictions, including Delaware, the law allows LLC organizers a
great deal of flexibility to create essentially any management structure they prefer.34
For example, an LLC can include non-economic ownership interests and can
establish voting interests in any manner desirable. 35 LLCs need not comply with
federal regulations and standards imposed upon publicly traded corporations or the
listing standards of the various exchanges if they do not trade publicly. Perhaps most
importantly, under Delaware law, LLC organizers may contractually limit or
eliminate fiduciary duties of owners and members to each other, to the entity, and to
any third party to the LLC’s operating agreement. 36 The ability to eliminate or
32.

See generally Larry Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1431 (2006).

33.

Id. at 1460–61 (citations omitted).

34. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-110(b) (2005). “[T]he policy of [Delaware’s LLC statute is] to give the

maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements.” Id. at § 18-1101(b).

35.

Id. at §§ 18-301(d) (non-economic ownership interests), 18-302(a) (voting interests).

36. Id. at § 18-1101(c). This ability cannot be exercised to eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair

dealing. Id.
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restrict fiduciary duties creates the possibility that an LLC’s operating agreement
could state that its mission is social good, not profit-maximization. A contractual
agreement eliminating the fiduciary duty of members or managers to conform to a
shareholder-primacy, profit-maximization model could theoretically remove the legal
concerns facing such a business organized in the traditional corporate form. These
flexibilities in ownership and control could encourage the creation of a business with
the specific goal of furthering social good.
Although the LLC form presents some opportunities for those organizing
businesses with explicit social goals, at this stage of development several impediments
remain. First, LLCs that do social work will not receive the tax advantages provided
to non-profit organizations as they will be subject to ordinary LLC regulation and
therefore might not be as attractive an investment vehicle for social contributors.
Further, although the law permits contractual limitations on fiduciary duties, the
complete elimination of them in the manner suggested above has yet to be tried, and
therefore has yet to be tested. Additionally, the LLC model was designed with
specific purposes in mind. 37 It was not intended to allow businesses to actively
advance social good. While the model may be flexible enough to accommodate such
ventures, there might be problems of signaling and identification of the goals and
mission of any particular LLC, and confusion between traditional LLCs and socially
intended LLCs. Clarity in the marketplace is important and therefore a straight
LLC model may not be the best alternative to use when organizing a business with
the purpose of advancing social good.
But wait. Traditional corporations and LLCs do not need to be able to actively
advance social good if other business models can meet that goal. Perhaps the nonprofit model is sufficient to advance the broader agenda of harnessing corporate
power to advance social welfare. After all, the goal of non-profits is precisely the
active advancement of social good. However, although non-profits can and do engage
in admirable work in this regard, they, like for-profits, are limited by legal and
practical constraints.
		

2. Non-profit models.

Can the non-profit model be used effectively to harness the power of corporate
action to promote social welfare? The first hurdle facing non-profits is that the power
of capitalism stems in large part from its profit-making capacity, seemingly the very
antithesis of the non-profit model. A business barred from generating profit cannot
take maximum advantage of the power of the market.
This impediment has been reduced somewhat over time. Traditionally, there was
a strict divide between for-profit and not-for-profit entities, and non-profits could
not engage in any profit-producing activity. Today, however, while non-profits are
still quite limited in the extent to which they may generate profit, current legal
37.

LLCs had their genesis in Wyoming. See Craig Langstraat & Dianne Jackson, Choice of Business Tax
Entity After the 1993 Tax Act, 11 Akron Tax J. 1, 5 (1995). They were designed as an entity to combine
pass-through attributes of the partnership with a limited liability characteristic. Id.
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regimes do not entirely bar them from doing so. Increasingly, non-profit entities are
linking with a for-profit venture, or adding a profit-making component to their
activities. This enables the non-profit to secure more steady and predictable funding,
and allows it to harness the power of the market to generate resources to further a
social welfare agenda.
Despite a loosening of legal restrictions in this area, there remain significant
constraints on the ability of a non-profit organization to add for-profit activities to
the mix. To qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, an organization must satisfy both an organizational and an operational
test.38 The organizational test examines whether the entity is organized primarily for
charitable purposes.39 The organizational test considers the relationship between the
non-profit entity’s mission, its charitable activities, and the profit-making component
of its activities.40 For an organization to be deemed exempt, its main activity must be
charitable; any for-profit activity conducted by it must be both “incidental” to the
non-profit activity and related to the entity’s charitable purpose.41
A more serious concern for a non-profit entity seeking to engage in profit-making
activities is the operational test. Under this test, an entity must operate primarily for one
or more exempt purposes.42 The pursuit of profit is usually not considered among the
exempt purposes for which a non-profit may operate, and under the operational test only
an insubstantial part of the non-profit’s activities can be in furtherance of a non-exempt
purpose.43 The difficulty for a non-profit organization is trying to determine what level
of for-profit activity will be considered insubstantial. The cost of misjudging that question
is high as it could lead to the loss of exempt status.44
Even if a non-profit conducts for-profit activity in a way that satisfies both the
organizational and operational tests and achieves exempt status it must still pay
unrelated business income tax. Known as UBIT, this tax attaches to all profits that
result from trade or business regularly carried out and not substantially related to the
performance of the organization’s exempt purpose.45 The requirement to pay UBIT
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2008).
39.

Although I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) states that to be exempt an entity must be organized “exclusively” for
charitable purposes, the provision is interpreted to mean “primarily” rather than solely. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501 (c)(1) (as amended in 2008).

40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(b)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
41.

See Pulpit Res. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 594, 610 (1978); Am. Inst. for Econ. Research v. United States, 302
F.2d 934, 938 (1962).

42.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(1) (as amended in 2008).

43.

See John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of their Nature and the
Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 Akron Tax J. 223, 236 (1996).

44. This difficulty is discussed in Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of

America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2437, 2438–39 (2005).

45.

I.R.C. § 513(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended in 2007). For example, a university that
operates athletic facilities for its students may be subject to UBIT if it makes those facilities and
personnel available for the conduct of a summer tennis camp. See Rev. Rul. 76-402, 1976-2 C.B. 177.

753

Carpe Crisis: Considering the Creation of Social Businesses

poses another disincentive for non-profits to engage in profit-making activities by
adding to the costs and complexities of their operations.
In addition to restrictions on the types of activities non-profits may engage in
and the tax burden they face if they engage in for-profit activities, non-profit entities
are limited in their ability to access capital. Law prohibits non-profits from
“distributing profits, or net earnings, to individuals who exercise control over [them],
such as its directors, officers, or members.”46 This prohibition has the effect of barring
non-profits from equity capital markets as they are unable to generate a return for
investors. This prevents non-profits from being fully able to harness the power of
capitalism to further their social goals as they remain primarily dependent on grants
and philanthropic donations for their survival and must pay high costs for capital if
such aid is not available.
Despite these hurdles, some non-profits manage to conduct profit-making
activities without compromising their exempt status. For example, Underwriter
Laboratories (“UL”) is an independent product safety certification organization that
is a non-profit, exempt entity.47 But through the use of fees charged for safety
certification, UL generates revenue to further its objectives. Similarly, Business for
Social Responsibility is an exempt organization that works with businesses to develop
sustainable business strategies and solutions.48 The organization sustains itself by
charging for memberships and conferences, and by operating a bookstore.49
Some non-profits that do not themselves engage in profit-making activities try to
enhance their ability to attract external funding by qualifying to receive programrelated investments (“PRIs”). PRIs are investments made by foundations that have as
their primary goal the furtherance of the foundations’ missions.50 A foundation may
make a PRI in a non-profit that aligns with the foundation’s goals. Unlike a
traditional grant, a PRI is a financial instrument that can generate a return for the
foundation from the non-profit entity in which it invests. Thus, PRIs are a way for
non-profits and foundations to more closely model the for-profit world, offering
foundations engaging in them both financial and programmatic returns.
46. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 501 (1981).
47.

Underwriter Laboratories, About, http://www.ul.com/global/eng/pages/corporate/aboutul/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2010).

48. Business for Social Responsibility, About: How We Work, http://www.bsr.org/about/how-we-work.

cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

49. Business for Social Responsibility, Membership Policies and Benefits (2009), http://www.bsr.org/

membership/members-only/Membership_Policy_Benefits_10.31.08_new.pdf.

50. See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A

Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 701, 764 (2008). A PRI may take many
forms, including an equity investment, a loan or a loan guarantee, though to be valid it must satisfy
several requirements. Specifically, (1) the investment’s primary purpose must be to accomplish one or
more of the foundation’s exempt purposes, (2) production of income or appreciation must not be a
significant purpose, and (3) influencing legislation or taking part in political campaigns on behalf of
candidates may not be a purpose. See generally, IRS.gov, Private Foundations (Sept. 24, 2009), http://
www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96114,00.html.
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Additionally, non-profit recipients of PRIs benefit from access to capital at lower
rates than might otherwise be available.51 Providers of PRIs benefit both because
their investment furthers their stated mission and because the funds used for PRIs
return to them and can be reused, which perpetuates the charitable cycle.
In theory, PRIs could provide non-profits a valuable source of revenue—they are
beneficial for both provider and recipient, are flexible, and make economic sense. By
allowing a return on investment in the non-profit context, PRIs narrow the gap
between the for-profit and not-for-profit model and offer a way to harness some of the
power of capitalism to further social good. However, in practice, PRIs are not widely
used.52 There are two primary reasons why PRIs do not occur with more frequency.
First, making a PRI requires complex documentation, comparable to making a marketrate investment, thereby increasing legal and administrative costs.53 Further, there is no
coordinated market for PRIs, limiting the ability of smaller foundations to enter the
field, even if they would like to participate in such investments.
Over time, the use of PRIs may expand. They certainly represent an important
opportunity for the non-profit sector and should be supported. At present, however,
similar to for-profit corporations, the practical and legal constraints on non-profit
entities prevent them from being able to fully utilize the power of capitalism to
actively advance social welfare. Perhaps a new form of business entity would be better
situated to do so. With that idea in mind, social entrepreneurs have begun to craft
new business models.
		

3. “Fourth-Sector” Businesses: For-Profit/Non-Profit Hybrids

As discussed above, there are significant hurdles facing those who wish to run
businesses for the explicit purpose of furthering social good. The corporate form,
with its emphasis on shareholder primacy and profit-maximization, is not well
designed to further that goal. The non-profit form, while permitting the express
pursuit of social welfare objectives, presents organizational, operational, and funding
constraints. Recognizing the limitations inherent in each model, creative individuals
are trying to design hybrid models that draw from the best aspects of both the forprofit and not-for-profit models while overcoming the shortfalls of each.54 Led by
prominent entrepreneurs (who admittedly have the economic resources to experiment
in ways that others might not), hybrid business proponents have devised a variety of
business models designed to bridge the divide between the for-profit and non-profit
51.

See Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward for the
Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 347–50 (2007).

52.

“Of the many thousands of grant-making foundations in the United States, only a few hundred make
PRIs. In addition, relatively few PRI funders maintain formal PRI programs or make PRIs on an
annual basis (about one out of three).” Foundation Center, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
foundationcenter.org/getstarted/faqs/html/pri.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010); see also Gottesman,
supra note 51, at 350.

53.

See Donald S. Chernoff, Program-Related Investments: A User-Friendly Guide (2005), available at
http://www.community-wealth.org./_pdfs/tools/pris/tool-macarthur-pri.pdf.

54. Gottesman, supra note 51, at 346.
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worlds. These hybrid efforts are frequently referred to as “creative capitalism,” “social
entrepreneurship,” and “fourth-sector businesses.”
A recent book, Creative Capitalism: A Conversation with Bill Gates, Warren Buffet,
and Other Economic Leaders, demonstrates the growing popularity of these hybrid
efforts.55 The book is a compilation of essays and commentary on capitalism,
philanthropy, and global development that takes as its starting point a speech Bill
Gates delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos.56 In that speech, Gates
acknowledged that many of the world’s problems are too big for philanthropy—even
on the scale of the Gates Foundation57—and that free-market capitalism would need
to help solve them.58 The book notes, “if more corporations are going to be ‘creative,’
then we surely need to consider new contractual forms that reflect the fact that firms
may want to do other things in addition to making money for their shareholders.”59
Businesses attempting to bridge the divide between traditional profit-maximizing
corporations and standard forms of non-profit organizations have achieved varying
degrees of success. Although the precise structure varies widely from firm to firm,
hybrid models typically include some linkage between a for-profit corporation and a
non-profit charitable endeavor. Most commonly the genesis of a hybrid entity comes
from a non-profit that seeks to expand its funding possibilities through the linkage.
To achieve this, a non-profit might establish a wholly owned, for-profit subsidiary, or
enter into a joint venture with or make a minority investment in such an entity.
One leading example of a fourth-sector venture is the Omidyar Network. Started
by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar, the organization “has completely abandoned the
traditional foundation structure [to fund] . . . both for-profit and non-profit projects
that will add up to social good and market-rate returns.”60 The Omidyar Network is
a philanthropic investment firm “dedicated to harnessing the power of markets to
create opportunity for people to improve their lives.”61 The venture consists of both a
501(c)(3) entity and an LLC, using the latter to invest in for-profit entities, and the
former to make grants. “Omidyar Network is based on the belief that businesses can
create extraordinary opportunity and value, and that market-based solutions can
generate significant social returns . . . . [and] that sustainability, innovation, and

55.

Creative Capitalism: A Conversation with Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and Other
Economic Leaders (Michael Kinsley ed., Simon & Schuster 2009) (2008).

56. Id. at 7.
57.

For a brief overview of amounts spent by the Gate Foundation, see Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, 2008 Annual Report 18–23 (2008), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
annualreport/2008/Pages/2008-annual-report.aspx.

58. Creative Capitalism, supra note 55, at 18, 41.
59.

Id. at 62.

60. Douglas McGray, Network Philanthropy: The Men Behind Ebay are Leading a High-Tech Revolution that is

Turning Charitable Giving on its Head, L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 2007, at 14.

61.

Omidyar Network, About Us: Evolution, http://www.omidyar.com/about_us (last visited Mar. 11,
2010).
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scale are . . . hallmarks of the private sector that are critical to addressing the global
challenges humans face today.” 62
Another well-known social enterprise is Google.org, a for-profit company with the
stated purpose of taking on social issues. The company’s founders, Sergey Brin and
Larry Page, have stated its general vision as “Don’t be evil. We believe strongly that in
the long term, we will be better served—as shareholders and in all other ways—by a
company that does good things for the world even if we forgo some short term gains.”63
Google.org was funded with a grant of three million shares in Google.com’s initial
public offering.64 Google has also pledged to contribute one percent of its annual
profits to Google.org.65 As of January 2008, Google has committed $75 million in
investments and grants to Google.org.66 While it, like other companies’ foundations,
makes grants, Google.org is untraditional in that it also makes for-profit investments,
encouraging Google employees to participate directly and lobbying public officials
for changes in policies.67 Google.org also manages the Google Foundation, a 501(c)(3)
organization whose stated goals are similar to those of Google.org.68
Another example of a hybrid business is Pacific Community Ventures (“PCV”),
which is a 501(c)(3) organization that “helps companies in traditionally overlooked
areas [] gain access to capital, business advice, and critical business resources that
will accelerate company growth.”69 The 501(c)(3) is paired with a for-profit investment
venture, Pacific Community Ventures Investment Partners.70
Similarly, the Emancipation Network pairs a 501(c)(3) organization with a forprofit corporation to fight slavery through business development.71 Specifically, the
venture uses tax-exempt donations to the 501(c)(3) entity to help slavery survivors

62. Collaborative Media Innovation, Innovators, http://www.imcollaborative.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=21 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

63. Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), Letter from the

Founders: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google Shareholders (Aug. 18, 2004).

64. Eric Auchard, Google.org Expands Funding to Attack World Crises, Reuters, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.

reuters.com/article/idUSN 17226771.

65.

Google.org, About Us: What is Google.org?, http://www.google.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2010).

66. Id.
67.

See Majorie Kelly, Not Just for Profit, Strategy + Bus., Spring 2009, at 1, 8, available at http://www.
strategy-business.com/media/file/enews-02-26-09.pdf.

68. For more information on the Google Foundation, see Google.org, The Google Foundation, http://

www.google.org/foundation.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

69. See Pacific Community Ventures, About Us, http://www.pacificcommunityventures.org/about-us/ (last

visited Mar. 11, 2010).

70. Id.
71.

See The Emancipation Network, About TEN, http://www.emancipationnetwork.org/aboutus.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2010).
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establish profitable businesses, and then uses the profits from those businesses to
fund the 501(c)(3) entity.72
Using a hybrid model offers several advantages to those wishing to operate a
business for the active advancement of social welfare. First, the model offers the nonprofit component greater flexibility to generate resources. For example, the for-profit
unit of the venture may be able to generate profit that the non-profit is not eligible to
pursue. Further, the for-profit unit could sell stock to investors, thereby tapping a
revenue source otherwise unavailable to the non-profit. The for-profit can then
donate some portion of the proceeds from the sales of stock to the non-profit. In
either scenario, the ability of the for-profit component to donate its proceeds to the
non-profit provides a more certain revenue stream to the non-profit than if it had to
rely exclusively on philanthropic donations.
The use of a hybrid business model poses significant hurdles as well. Importantly,
if the non-profit controls the for-profit, then any income from rent, royalties, or
interest that the non-profit component receives will be subject to UBIT.73 Another
serious impediment is the lack of knowledge about the legal consequences of linking
for-profit and non-profit entities. Is it true, as one hybrid business participant
supposes, that “as long as there is an inside relationship between the entities (in our
case 1 common employee between the two) then the non-profit cant [sic] in any way
help the for profit?”74 Currently, many fourth-sector participants feel stymied by the
complex and contradictory legal regulation of hybrid business models. As one fourthsector participant noted, “[o]ur hybrid is an integration of both for-profit and
not-for-profit methodologies and we couldn’t find anywhere yet [sic] a legal system
that can accommodate us.” 75
In addition to lack of knowledge of the legal implications of melding the quite
disparate worlds of for-profit and non-profit entities, there are cultural differences in
the approach to the business operations of each that may impede an effective marriage
of the two. There are also potentially problematic reputational issues that may arise
from linking a profit-making venture with a philanthropic entity. Further, some fear
that a bifurcation may dilute important organizational strength and clarity of vision
by “forcing the entity into a multiple, de-centralized organizational structure,” and
that while such a structure may at times be beneficial, there are times, “particularly
in the early stages of the organization’s development, that this can be fatal.” 76
72. See id.
73. I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D) (2006); see also Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid, Note, A Call for Reform of the

Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1855, 1866–67 n.47
(2001)

74.

Posting of John Berger to Socialedge, http://www.socialedge.org/discussions/business-models/
archive/2007/11/08/the-for-profit-non-profit-hybrid-model#comments (May 7, 2009, 23:08).

75. Posting of Laurinda to Socialedge, http://www.socialedge.org/discussions/business-models/

archive/2007/11/08/the-for-profit-non-profit-hybrid-model#comments (May 7, 2009, 23:08).

76. Posting of Leigh Melander to Socialedge, http://www.socialedge.org/discussions/business-models/

archive/2007/11/08/the-for-profit-non-profit-hybrid-model#comments (May 7, 2009, 23:08).
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B. New Corporate Forms

The recent breakdown of the financial system provides strong motivation to
capitalize on the current attention to alternative approaches toward changing
capitalism and the laws governing business entities. Fourth-sector entrepreneurs are
taking valuable steps in that direction, but current legal regimes have stymied
progress. In short, more is needed. In light of the current strong sentiment that
capitalism “can be put to better use than serving greed, speculation and that miniscule
percentage at the very top . . . . [and that profit distribution should be] [] based also
on human needs so that the social businesses created have a true purpose beyond
simply profit,” 77 now is an opportune time to consider alternative legal models.
Currently, several attempts have been made toward that end.
		

1. B Corporations

Recognizing that the traditional conceptualization of the corporation constrains
efforts to use that form to advance social good, efforts are underway to re-conceptualize
the corporation in ways that would broaden the purposes that corporations could be
organized to further. One such effort is the creation of “B corporations.”
The brainchild of Jay Coen Gilbert, B corporations (the B stands for benefit or
beneficial), are corporations that choose to qualify under a certification system that
designates them as socially responsible to consumers and investors.78 B corporations
agree to engage in “triple bottom line” accounting—focusing on social, environmental,
and economic returns.79 Prominent examples of such entities include Ben and Jerry’s,
Burt’s Bees, and Numi Tea, among others.80 To gain the B corporation designation
(which is granted by B Lab81), a corporation must be incorporated in a state that has
a constituency statute that allows directors to consider the interests of both investor
and non-investor stakeholders, and amend its articles of incorporation to state
explicitly that managers must consider the interests of employees, the community,
and the environment.82 B corporations must also pay B Lab one-tenth of one percent
77.

Posting of Vivian Norris de Montaigu to studyunus.net http://studyunus.wordpress.com/2008/08/08/
davos-2008-bill-gates-creative-capitalism-and-muhammad-yunus-social-business-vivian-norris-demontaigu/#more-66 (Aug. 8, 2008).

78. See B Corporation.net, Understand Legal, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (last visited Mar.

11, 2010).

79. See Mary Catherine O’Connor, B Corporation: A Way for “Good” Companies to Walk the Walk (Apr. 17,

2009), http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/04/b-corporation-a-way-for-good-companies-to-walk-the-walk/.

80. See B Corporation.net, Community, http://www.bcorporation.net/community (use “Find a B Corp”

search box and enter Corporation’s name) (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

81.

B Lab is the 501(c)(3) non-profit that administers the B Corp.’s processes. O’Connor, supra note 79.

82. For example, the recommended language in New York for inclusion in a B corporation’s articles of

incorporation states:

In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of the
Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider such factors as the Director
deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and interests of

759

Carpe Crisis: Considering the Creation of Social Businesses

of corporate revenue and score at least forty out of one-hundred points on a survey B
Lab administers to rate the corporation’s adherence to social goals.83
The hope is that by adopting B corporation language in an entity’s articles of
incorporation, a small business will be less afraid to take on outside investors out of
fear that those investors will insist on profit-maximization. The fate of pre-B
corporation Ben & Jerry’s is illustrative of the potential fate small, socially active
corporations face. In 2000, the Dutch conglomerate Unilever offered to buy Ben &
Jerry’s.84 Known for their socially conscious business stance, founders Ben Cohen
and Jerry Greenfield resisted the offer and, with other investors, put together a
counter-offer of their own at a lower price.85 Shareholders of the publicly traded
company sued and argued that corporate law mandated that the directors accept the
higher offer.86 The court agreed, and Unilever acquired Ben & Jerry’s in April 2000
for $326 million.87
Conversely, there are some potential problems with using B corporations to actively
advance social good. Primary among these is that the B corporation “model” amounts
to little more than a new certification scheme, rather than a new legal model for the
corporate form. B corporations do not enjoy special tax status, and it is unclear how
established corporate law principles would treat them. Questions about the legal
the Company and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of
any action on the current and retired employees, the suppliers and customers of the
Company or its subsidiaries, and the communities and society in which the Company
or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the shareholders, the “Stakeholders”),
together with the short-term, as well as long-term, interests of its shareholders and the
effect of the Company’s operations (and its subsidiaries’ operations) on the environment
and the economy of the state, the region and the nation.

B Corporation.net, Legal Roadmap, http://survey.bcorporation.net/become/legal.php (click
“State of Incorporation”; then scroll down to “New York”). Also specifically recommended
for inclusion is language designed to preempt fiduciary duty claims:

Id.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Director is entitled to rely on the definition of
“best interests” as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder and under
state law, and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a breach of
a Director’s fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change in Control
Transaction where, as a result of weighing other Stakeholders’ interests, a Director
determines to accept an offer, between two competing offers, with a lower price per
share.

83. For more information on the requirements for becoming a B corporation, see B Corporation.net,

Become, http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

84. See Posting of Dave Marino-Nachison to The Motley Fool, A Happy “Ending” for Ben & Jerry’s?, http://

www.fool.com/news/foolplate/2000/foolplate000412.htm (Apr. 12, 2000); Posting of Richard McCaffrey
to The Motley Fool, Ben & Jerry’s Final Chapter?, http://www.fool.com/news/2000/quicknews000329.
htm (Mar. 29, 2000).

85. See Marino-Nachison, supra note 84.
86. Hannah Clark Steinman, A New Kind of Company, Inc., July 1, 2007, http://www.inc.com/magazine/

20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company.html.

87.

See id.
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implications of the form include such issues as whether the suggested language in a B
corporation’s articles of incorporation would provide it any legal protection if the
corporation and its directors were sued for putting non-investor stakeholder interests
ahead of, or even on par with, shareholder interests. Will B corporation election and
certification protect directors in such a situation, or will it create only contractual duties
running from directors to stakeholders while leaving traditional fiduciary duties
unaffected? Can shareholders of B corporations change the law applicable to their
entity through the recognition of non-investor stakeholder interests, or must the
corporate law of the state in which such an entity incorporates be modified to expressly
allow such a shift? Would managers of current public corporations be able to generate
sufficient voting support to seek B corporation certification? Will incorporation in a
jurisdiction that allows directors to consider non-investor stakeholder interests legally
protect a B corporation’s business decisions in a jurisdiction that does not recognize
non-investor interests as legitimate business considerations?
In addition, B corporations will be limited in their access to capital insofar as
investors seeking maximum economic returns will direct their money elsewhere.
Further, it may be difficult to maintain focus on the social objectives that constitute
part of the corporation’s mission. “Legacy drag” may set in as once the original
founder of the B corporation is no longer the driving force behind its operations, the
focus of concern may change. To the extent that B corporations articulate general
statements about their missions and strive to “further community interests,” for
example, the goals may become less certain and present more opportunity for intracorporation disagreement.
Finally, even if B corporation certification became popular and the legal issues
surrounding them were resolved, such entities would still be limited to the “do no
harm” type of social responsibility. While B corporation certification broadens the
interests corporate managers may consider when making business decisions, it does not
remove their need to show ultimate benefit to the corporation. Thus, while B
corporations have the potential to quiet some of the CSR debate, they do not solve the
problem of harnessing the power of corporations to actively advance social good.
		

2. L3C’s: Low-Profit Limited Liability Company

Another new corporate form created to allow entities to advance social good is
the L3C, or low-profit limited liability company. Standing between for-profit and
non-profit entities, L3Cs are organized in the same way as an ordinary LLC, but are
designated as low-profit organizations with explicit charitable or educational goals.88
L3Cs are for-profit in the sense that investors are entitled to distributions and any
appreciation in their investment, but non-profit in the sense that they are organized
primarily for charitable purposes.89
88. See Americans for Community Development, About L3C, http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.

org./about.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

89. See id.
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L3Cs were first enacted by Vermont in 2008, and have spread to other
jurisdictions,90 with efforts underway to enact them in other states and on the federal
level.91 To qualify as an L3C under Vermont law (which is representative of other
jurisdictions), an entity must include the L3C designation in its name and in its
articles of organization.92 The basic intent of the L3C characterization is to signal to
foundations that the entity intends to conduct its activities in a manner that would
qualify it to receive program-related investments93 without the need to obtain a
private letter ruling.94 In this way, L3C designation is comparable to B Corporation
certification—it signals to the market that the entity, although organized using a forprofit, corporate form, will engage to some degree in the promotion of social goals.
Basic organization in the LLC form provides advantages of organizational
flexibility while maintaining a recognized business model. Beyond that, the operating
agreement of an L3C can be drafted to include express provisions regarding the
social mission of the organization, return on investment, and use of proceeds.95
Further, an L3C’s members can agree that interests other than profit-maximization
will control the entity’s operation.96 The operating agreement also may contain
restrictions on the transferability of shares, ensuring that only those who share the
social mission of the L3C become involved with the enterprise.97 Finally, the methods
of organization and governance structure of L3Cs encourage their social agenda.
L3Cs are commonly formed by the foundations who wish to use them to place
PRIs.98 Thus, foundations are the members of the L3C and under LLC law may
elect the entity’s board. Thus, members retain the ability to ensure that the goals of
the L3C are honored and that the board does not co-opt the process and focus only
on profit-maximization.
90. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008); Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.4102(m) (2009); Wyo.

Stat. Ann. § 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009).

91.

For updated information about efforts to enact L3C legislation, see Nonprofit Law Blog: L3C—
Developments & Resources, http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/home/2009/03/l3c-developmentsresources.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

92.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3005(a)(2).

93.

For a full description of program-related investments, see supra text accompanying notes 50–53.

94. See The L3C Status: Groups Explore Structure that Limits Liability for Program-Related Investing,

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+L3C+status:+groups+explore+structure+that+limits+liability+
for...-a0208056187 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010). Private letter rulings are rulings from the IRS that an
entity is in compliance with its regulations. IRS.gov, Exempt Organizations—Private Letter Rulings
and Determination Letters, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=123213,00.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2010). While not required under the law, the danger of non-compliance is great enough
that it is generally recommended to seek such a ruling before engaging in PRIs. See id.

95. See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2009).
96. See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (2009).
97.

See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 18-702 (2009).

98. Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and Mission Driven

Organizations 5, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SN036, at 2 (2007).

762

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

In time, L3Cs may become a viable method for some non-profits to effectively
bridge the for-profit/non-profit divide.99 However, at present, recognition of the form
is limited in scope. While it may be true that once one state accepts the L3C as a
new corporate form that form would be valid in all states, it is not necessarily also
true that the law would know how to deal with them. Additionally, there are
indications that state tax regulators will not simply accept that an L3C designation
means that the entity bearing that title qualifies as an entity capable of making PRIs.
Private letter rulings may still be required to ensure that an entity formed under the
L3C label complies with the requisite tax formalities. Further, L3Cs may expand the
role of private foundations but may still be limited in the amount of active advancement
of social good they can achieve.
II. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO CREATE NEW CORPORATE FORMS

As the preceding discussion shows, current legal regimes pose significant
problems for entrepreneurs who want to operate a for-profit business that seeks to
further social good rather than simply maximize economic return for its shareholders.
In recognition of this, several legislative efforts at changing the legal regime have
been considered and in some cases adopted.
A. Efforts in the United States

Several states have made efforts to statutorily allow business entities to have a
broader mandate than the maximization of profit for their shareholders. As an example,
in 2006, Minnesota proposed the Minnesota Responsible Business Corporation Act
(the “Act”).100 Under the Act, a corporation could choose to select a socially responsible
status and be designated a Socially Responsible Corporation by including the letters
“SRC” instead of the standard “Inc.” after its corporate name.101
Under the Act, directors of SRCs would be required to consider the interests of
stockholders, employees, customers, creditors, and the “public interest.”102 The Act
defines “public interest” as “the general public well-being of present and future
generations including, but not limited to, the economy, natural environment, public
health, public safety, human rights, educational and other human development
99. Proponents of L3Cs argue that the business model

[P]rovides for better utilization of foundation and trust funds and gives them a
reasonable control of how their money is used . . . [and] provides for reuse of the money
and can lead to capital gains and the generation of substantial profits in the long run. It
is more in keeping with the American free enterprise system . . . and can [] get many
operating nonprofits out from under the morass of regulation that surrounds
nonprofits.

Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and Mission Driven
Organizations, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SN036, at 5 (2007).
100. H.F. 4161 § 1, 2005 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006); S.F. 1153 § 1, 2007 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2007).
101. Minn. H.F. 4161 § 4(d); Minn. S.F. 1153 § 4(d).
102. Minn. H.F. 4161 § 6; Minn. S.F. 1153 § 6.
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opportunities, and the general well-being of the local, state, national, or world
community.”103 SRCs also must allow employees to nominate and elect twenty
percent of the board of directors with another twenty percent of the board reserved
for directors selected by the elected board members to represent the public interest.104
If an SRC elects to trade publicly, it must publish a “Public Interest Report” together
with its annual report, and must train its directors, officers, and employees regarding
their duties to stakeholders.105 Importantly, the Act explicitly removes the fiduciary
obligation of directors and officers to act solely in the interests of shareholders, thus
removing the profit-maximizing mandate.106
While it has not yet been enacted, the Act recognizes the current difficulties in
trying to harness the power of capitalism to further social goals. If enacted, the Act
would eliminate the need to engage in the CSR debate. It is not free from problems,
however. Corporations choosing the SRC designation may suffer from a lack of
flexibility, including constraints on future action and limited access to credit. The
cost and uncertainty associated with external regulation (even if voluntarily accepted)
also may limit the effectiveness of such legislation.
Even if legislation similar to the Act was widely enacted and corporations eagerly
signed on, the Act would not facilitate the creation of businesses exclusively dedicated
to the active advancement of social welfare. Thus, while the Act represents a potential
step toward allowing corporate executives to consider objectives beyond profitmaximization, it does not go as far as needed to allow businesses to operate solely for
purposes other than shareholder benefit.
B. International Efforts

One of the first regulatory efforts to bridge the for-profit/non-profit divide
occurred in Britain. In 2005, the United Kingdom enacted legislation allowing for
the creation of community interest companies (“CICs”).107 These entities are a new
type of company “that balances the flexibility of the traditional for-profit limited
company model with the recognition that social enterprises involve stakeholders
other than shareholders, whose interests deserve legal protection currently lacking in
U[nited] K[ingdom] law.”108
103. Minn. H.F. 4161 § 2 subdiv. 2; Minn. S.F. 1153 § 2 subdiv. 2.
104. Minn. H.F. 4161 §§ 6(a)–(c); Minn. S.F. 1153 §§ 6(a)–(c). The elected directors must make their

selections after consultation with people or groups representing the public interest. Minn. H.F. 4161
§§ 6(a)–(c); Minn. S.F. 1153 §§ 6(a)–(c).

105. Minn. H.F. 4161 § 9 subdiv. 2; Minn. S.F. 1153 § 9 subdiv. 2.
106. Minn. H.F. 4161 § 8; Minn. S.F. 1153 § 8. For a discussion of the Act, see Susan MacCormac, The

Emergence of New Corporate Forms, Center for Policy Development, Jan. 15, 2008, http://cpd.org.au/
article/emergence-new-corporate-forms.

107. The designation “Community Investment Company” was introduced by the Companies (Audit,

Investigations and Community Enterprise Bill) Bill, 2003–04, H.L. Bill 142 (Gr. Brit.).

108. Paul Bater, United Kingdom: The Community Interest Company Proposal, 1 Int’l J. Civ. Soc’y L. 114, 115

(2003).
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To qualify as a CIC, a firm must: (1) have a purpose regarded by a reasonable
person as beneficial to the community, and (2) ensure that benefits provided will not
be limited to an unduly restricted group.109 Under UK company law, CICs may seek
financing from any source and do not have any special tax-exempt status.110 They are
regulated by the CIC Regulator (a new office of the Registrar of Companies).111 The
Regulator screens companies seeking a CIC designation and monitors their activities
through the required submission of an annual community interest report, which
must include details about payment of dividends, amounts paid to directors, and how
the CIC has furthered its mission with regard to its stakeholders.112
CICs may operate as a for-profit business, by, for example, selling products for
profit and paying dividends to individual shareholders. At the same time, their
explicit purpose is the active advancement of social good, locating them closer to the
non-profit end of the spectrum. Thus, CICs are a specific attempt to solve the
problems encountered by businesses wishing to harness the power of capitalism for
social good.
CICs are an important step forward, and may serve as a model for other
jurisdictions seeking to expand the universe of business entities. CICs are not free
from problems, however. One impediment, for example, is a unique aspect of CIC
regulation known as “asset lock.” Pursuant to asset-lock regulation, any CIC asset
must be either retained in the CIC to further the community purpose for which the
entity was formed, or transferred by the CIC according to one of the following
requirements: (1) the transfer is made for full consideration so that the CIC retains
the value of the assets transferred; (2) the transfer is made to another asset-locked
body, which is specified in the CIC’s memorandum or articles of association; (3) the
transfer is made to another asset-locked body with the consent of the CIC regulator;
or (4) the transfer is otherwise made for the benefit of the community.113
The asset lock bars a CIC from distributing any assets or profits to their members
except to the extent permitted when the CIC issues equity.114 The net effect of the
asset-lock requirement is that once a CIC owns assets, those assets will forever be
locked into social or charitable purposes.115 This limitation on a CIC’s use of its
109. H.L. Bill 142 (Gr. Brit.).
110. Id.; Bater, supra note 108, at 116.
111. Bater, supra note 108, at 114.
112. Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information Pack, Community Interest

Companies 37–38 (2009) [hereinafter CIC Information Pack], http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/
CICleaflets/CIC%20INFORMATION%20PACK%20V00.04%20Final.pdf.

113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 15.
115. See Ian Dawson, The Rule Against Inalienability—A Rule Without a Purpose?, 26 Legal Stud. 414, 415

(2006) (U.K.) (arguing against asset lock). “‘Asset lock’ is a general term used to cover all the provisions
[of the Act] designed to ensure that the assets of the CIC (including any profits or other surpluses
generated by its activities) are used for the benefit of the community.” CIC Information Pack, supra
note 112, at 14.
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capital may inhibit potential investors in such entities. Moreover, courts in other
jurisdictions may view asset lock as an unwarranted restraint on capital. Thus, while
CICs are an important innovation and a creative step toward bridging the for-profit/
non-profit divide, they are not an ideal solution to the problem of how businesses can
be best organized to work for the social good.
III.	A NEW BUSINESS ENTITY: THE “SOCIAL BUSINESS”

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, while there has been some movement
away from the notion that businesses must operate solely to maximize profits for
their shareholders, there is not yet an ideal business model for the active advancement
of social good. Instead of tinkering with existing models, perhaps now is the time to
“carpe crisis”—to capitalize on the breakdown of capitalism and conceptualize a new
form of business that would allow us to achieve that goal without the current
constraints. The meltdown in our financial system showed that the current market
system is not perfect, and created an opportunity to broaden our conceptualization of
the nature and purposes of corporations. To be clear, not every corporation can or
should be organized to actively advance the social good, but certainly there should be
room in our system to accommodate investors who choose to participate in such
ventures.
The idea that corporate power can be harnessed to directly address a social
problem is currently being tested by Mohammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen
Bank (the “Bank”) and the winner (together with the Grameen Bank) of the 2006
Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to create economic and social development from
below.”116 Dr. Yunus advocates for, and is attempting, the creation of “social
businesses.”117
116. Press Release, Nobel Foundation, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006, (Oct. 13, 2006), http://nobelprize.

org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.

117. Skeptics should take note that Dr. Yunus and the Grameen Bank showed similar innovation when they

developed the notion of microcredit. Microcredit was initially viewed as a “radical experiment.” See
Isobel Coleman, Defending Microfinance, 29 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 181, 182 (2005).
The experiment began in the 1970s. Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist
Morality of Globalizing Markets?, 5 Yale Hum Rts. & Dev. L.J. 85, 92 (2002). By the 1980s it was seen
as a better alternative to traditional development programs that generally involved large-scale, capitalintensive infrastructure projects such as dams and power plants, funded by large-scale international
financial institutions such as the World Bank. Id. Projects funded under this “top-down” bureaucratic
approach had numerous flaws. Id. They were often co-opted by the governments whose populations
were intended to benefit from the project, were largely designed and implemented without the
participation of the target populations, and often not only failed to achieve their desired result, but
caused serious adverse consequences in the communities in which they were implemented. Id.

		
In contrast to this top-down approach, microcredit reaches target populations directly and provides
the poor with access to markets through the provision of credit, capital, and training. Id. at 86. Its
success is attributable to many factors, chief among them is its utilization of market mechanisms to
achieve its aims. Id. at 87. Microcredit “explicitly uses market incentives to create a credit market for the
poor . . . characterized by two features: readily available funds and repayment requirements.” Id.
From its humble beginnings, microcredit has grown exponentially and has gained currency across
the political spectrum and with international institutions, including those that at one time relied exclusively
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A. The Basics of Social Businesses

The term “social business,” as used by Dr. Yunus, takes a slightly different
meaning from the alternative business models considered thus far. As conceived by
Dr. Yunus, certain precepts must hold true for a business to consider itself “social.”
At its core, a social business must carry on a viable enterprise.118 It must identify and
fill a market need for goods or services.119 Unlike a traditional business, however, a
social business must be created and run for the express purpose of pursing specific,
articulated social goals, rather than maximizing profit.120 A social business must
behave as an ordinary market participant, acting in competition with all players.121 It
must, at a minimum, cover its costs.122 Ideally, it will generate profits.123 Unlike a
traditional business, however, dividends paid to investors cannot exceed the amount
of their investment—i.e., investors cannot profit from the company’s proceeds; rather
all proceeds in excess of that required to repay investors should be used to further the
business enterprise and its social goal.124
The “defining objective” of a social business must be to reverse the traditional
profit-maximizing goal and replace it with benefit maximization.125 Those social
benefits may be created in various ways. First, a social business may be run with the
express purpose of providing goods and services to communities that might otherwise
lack access to them. An example of this kind of social business is one that provides
health care to under-served communities.126 To qualify as a social business, the
venture would have to cover its costs, provide care for a disadvantaged group, and
offer no more return to its shareholders than their original investment.127
A second form of social business is one run by a disadvantaged group, with the
express purpose of providing skills, training, and gainful employment to the
managing population.128 Unlike the social business run to provide a market need to
on traditional development models. Coleman, supra, at 182. Some of the high points in the rise of
microcredit, include but certainly are not limited to, the following examples: in 1998, The United Nations
General Assembly declared that 2005 would be the International Year of Microcredit, and in 1999, the
World Bank, in conjunction with a consortium of international lending groups, created the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor, which now operates with a multi-million dollar budget. Id. at 183.
118. Muhammad Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of

Capitalism 21–23 (2007).

119. Id.
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id. at 26.
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id. at 24.
124. See id. at 23–24.
125. Id. at 23.
126. See id. at 29.
127. See id. at 23–28.
128. Id. at 28.
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disadvantaged populations, this second model of social business could be run for any
purpose, so long as it uses its profits to further its existence and continue its mission
of empowering its stakeholders.129 As noted below, this model of social business
presents some challenges to the original conceptualization—while social businesses
in the purest sense are non-loss, non-dividend enterprises, this second model
contemplates the payment of dividends to its stakeholders as they are the targets of
the social objectives of the enterprise.130
Although social businesses have much in common with both “traditional”
businesses and with philanthropic ventures, they differ in some fundamental aspects.
Charities distinguish themselves from traditional businesses by expressly focusing on
social needs that for-profit businesses largely disregard. Social businesses share this
focus, but unlike charities, must cover their costs and may not be dependent on
continual injections of funds from outside sources.131 Further, while donors to
charities expect no return other than the intangible feeling of “goodness” they may
experience when making a donation, investors in a social business can and should
expect the return of their investment.132 While it is likely that many will rapidly
re-invest those funds in the same or another social enterprise, that decision remains
with the investor.133 Thus, while those investors will not be able or entitled to get any
more than their original investment back, they will benefit both from the “goodness”
experienced from aiding a social goal and from the return of their investment capital.
As with a traditional business, there is no guarantee that investors will be able to
recoup their investment—market risk always exists. Social businesses should be run
with the expectation that they will return investors’ capital, and the time frame for
doing so will be detailed in the investment prospectus for each entity.134
These aspirational goals of a social business may leave skeptics doubting that
such an enterprise could ever exist. While questions about the model persist and
many issues remain to be explored, the model has already been put to the test.
B. The Example of Grameen Danone Foods

The first “social business” attempted using Dr. Yunus’s model was Grameen
Danone Foods Limited (“GDFL”). Groupe Danone and Grameen Bank jointly
founded GDFL with the objective of providing fortified yogurt to under-nourished
children in Bangladesh.135 In March 2006, the parties entered into a memorandum
of understanding (“MOU”) in which they agreed that Danone and a group of four
Grameen companies would split fifty-fifty the total approximated $1.1 million
129. Id. at 28–29.
130. Id. at 24–29.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 24–25.
134. Id. at 24.
135. See id. at 132.
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start-up cost.136 The MOU stated expressly that GDFL was to be a social business
with the mission of reducing poverty, bringing daily nutrition to the poor, and
sharing the benefits with its community of stakeholders.137 It called for GDFL to
design a manufacturing and distribution model that drew local communities,
including sourcing supply from local farmers and hiring local populations to staff the
plant and contribute to the creation of jobs through its distribution network.138 The
MOU further stated that the business was to be run to incur no losses and to generate
a profit sufficient to repay the initial investments of the Danone and Grameen
companies.139 In a deviation from the pure form of no-loss, no-dividend model of a
social business, the parties agreed to pay a one percent dividend “as a way of publicly
recognizing the ownership of [the] company and to make it possible for Danone to
show a figure in the appropriate line of its balance sheet.”140
GDFL opened its first yogurt plant in Bogra, Bangladesh in March 2008.141 The
facility aimed to produce 3000 tons of low cost, highly nutritious yogurt per year
from milk supplied by 300 micro-farms established with credit from Grameen
Bank.142 It was also announced that additional financing would be provided to
expand capacity at the Bogra plant and to open a second facility near Dhaka.143
Like any business, GDFL confronted many challenges in attempting to run a
successful social venture. The company encountered distribution problems because of
an untrained sales force, and lacked the refrigeration necessary to maintain the
product in its optimal state.144 Additionally, the profit margin on the product was
extremely low, making it difficult to motivate the sales force.145 After one year of
operation, GDFL had trouble generating enough profit to cover its costs,146 an
136. See id. at 144.
137. Id. at 144–45.
138. Id. at 145.
139. Id. at 138.
140. Id. at 138. Mohammad Yunus notes that “[n]ow, in hindsight and with further thought, I am in favor of

removing the dividend clause . . . If Danone agrees, we’ll do that, to make it match with the definition
of social business as . . . a non-loss, non-dividend business.” Id.

141. Press Release, Groupe Danone, First Board Meeting of the French Risk Mutual Fund danone.

communities, (Mar. 2008), http://www.danone.com/en/news/focus/world-wetlands-day.html.

142. For more details on the operations of the enterprise, see Yunus, supra note 118, at 129–48; Carol Matlack,

Danone Innovates to Help Feed the Poor, BusinessWeek, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/
globalbiz/content/apr2008/gb20080428_971498.htm; Sheridan Prasso, Saving The World with a Cup of
Yogurt, Fortune, Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.sheridanprasso.com/fortune_yunus_yogurt.htm.

143. Press Release, Groupe Danone, First Board Meeting of the French Risk Mutual Fund danone.

communities, (Mar. 2008), http://www.danone.com/en/news/focus/world-wetlands-day.html.

144. For a full accounting of GDFL and its struggles, see Asad Kamran Ghalib & Farhad Hossain, Social

Business Enterprises—Maximising Social Benefits or Maximising Profits? The Case of Grameen-Danone
Foods Limited (Brooks World Poverty Institute, Working Paper No. 51, 2008), available at http://www.
bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-5108-abstract.pdf.

145. Id. at 10.
146. Id.
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essential attribute of a successful social business. While there are plans to address
these problems,147 the long-term success of GDFL cannot be predicted at this point.
Despite the uncertain future of GDFL, both Grameen and Danone remain
committed to the idea of social business. Grameen is exploring several other social
ventures, including a joint venture with Intel Corporation to address the needs of the
rural poor through information technology.148 Grameen also began operating a
second social business, the Grameen GC Eye Care Hospital, which is now in
operation in Bogra and Barisal.149
C. The Potential of Social Businesses

The burgeoning interest in fourth-sector enterprises and the increasing attention
being paid to “creative capitalism” demonstrate that there is a large pool of potential
investors and likely participants ready to form social businesses. Entrepreneurs who
seek to create new businesses will prefer such ventures over passively donating their
monies to charity. Philanthropists may prefer to invest in a social business rather
than traditional charitable vehicles because they will optimally receive their initial
investment back, and can then re-use that capital to invest in another social business
or for other purposes. The ability of social businesses to return an investor’s original
capital makes the model a superior option.
Noteworthy in this regard is the degree of seriousness with which Danone
is committed to the idea of social businesses. Danone has created a new unit,
danone.communities, with the express purpose of funding social businesses,150 and
signaling that while GDFL was the company’s first project it is not intended to be its
last. The new entity is studying partnerships with local Asian and African nongovernmental organizations based on the model and experience of GDFL.151
Contrary to those who might argue that social businesses will be unable to attract
top-flight directors and investors, danone.communites launched with a €20 million

147. Id.
148. Press Release, Intel, Grameen Announce Joint Business Venture to Fuel Social and Economic

Development Opportunities Empowered by Technology (May 19, 2008), http://w w w.
grameensocialbusiness.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=47&Ite
mid=90&limitstart=5.

149. Yunus Centre, Grameen GC Eye Care Hospital, http://www.muhammadyunus.org/Social-Business/

grameen-gc-eye-care-hospital/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).

150. Danone.communities is a product of the meeting between Franck Riboud, CEO of Danone, and Dr.

Muhammad Yunus. “With danone.communities, we uphold a conviction: to invent business models that
benefit the most disadvantaged populations.” http://www.danonecommunities.com/fr/node/146 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010); Liam Black, Pots of Gold, The Guardian, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/society/2009/feb/18/liam-black-bangladesh. As an investment fund, danone.communities makes
it possible to finance these new types of businesses that, thanks to Danone’s skills, have a lasting social
impact. Id.

151. See id.
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investment from Groupe Danone, a €30 million investment from institutional
investors, and has attracted funds from the French Mutual Fund (“SICAV”).152
Moreover, it is also worth noting the composition of the board of directors of the
French Risk Mutual Fund (“FCPR” or the “Fund”), also a danone.communities
investor. The Fund’s board members come from many countries, professions, and
areas of interest. Its members include Mohammad Yunus, Groupe Danone CEO
Franck Riblut, the founder of Stonyfield Farm, the CEO of Credit Agricole, and the
former Minister for Reconstruction & Development of South Africa.153
Social businesses will also attract those who are dissatisfied with the current
model of capitalism and its emphasis on enriching a select few, giving them an option
of investing in an entity that recognizes and utilizes the power of the corporate form
to benefit more stakeholders than current corporate forms are willing or able to.
Finally, the form will appeal to those people who simply want another weapon to
levy at social problems that are currently not being solved by other means.
Clearly, not all businesses can or should be run as social businesses. However,
there is room for creativity and flexibility in the role that corporations can play, and
social businesses will allow those with the resources and the inclination to harness
corporate power to advance the social good.
IV. CONCLUSION

The turmoil in our financial system provides an opportunity to rethink the basic
structures under which our economic system has long functioned. The greed and
dysfunction revealed by recent events shows that current models are far from perfect.
While not advocating a radical overthrow of the existing system, perhaps we can
take this opportunity to expand our universe and allow for the explicit recognition
and creation of businesses that aim to address social problems. Economics is after all
a social science. Broadening our understanding of the role corporations can play and
the goals to which they should aspire will allow us to return the social aspect to that
science and to harness the power of capitalism to actively advance social good.

152. Up to ten percent of the assets of that Fund are invested in social businesses through the French Risk

Mutual Fund. Press Release, Groupe Danone, First Board Meeting of the French Risk Mutual Fund
danone.communities (Mar. 2008), http://www.danone.com/en/news/focus/world-wetlands-day.html.

153. See id. for a complete list of the Board of Directors, together with a short biographical sketch.
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